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Colgate opinion, and improved techniques have eliminated the necessity
for many of the dubious visual practices once common. 8 The important
point, however, is that the industry recognizes the Colgate opinion as
establishing a standard by which it may govern itself in the future. It
would thus appear that the Commission was successful, by means of a
formal cease and desist proceedings, in providing a meaningful guidepost for the advertising industry in regard to false advertising.

INTERSTATE DISSEMINATION OF ADVERTISING:
JURISDICTION WHICH MUST BE EARNED
Section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares unlawful all "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce.

.

.

."'

False advertising is

recognized as an unfair method, act or practice within the meaning of
section 5 (a) (1).2 In addition, section 12 of the Act specifically makes
it unlawful to disseminate in commerce any false advertisement designed
to induce the purchase of foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.' If a false
advertisement relates to other commodities, the FTC has historically exercised jurisdiction under section 5(a) (1) where the sale is in interstate
commerce. For forty-six years after the passage of the Act, however,
the FTC did not attempt to assert jurisdiction over false advertising for
commodities other than those mentioned in section 12 where the dissemination was interstate but the sale was intrastate.
68. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.

1. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958), amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
The FTC enforces this declaration by issuing cease and desist orders as provided under
15 U.S.C. § 45(6) (1958), and promoting voluntary compliance by a variety of techniques.
2. Lighthouse Rug Co. v. FTC, 35 F.2d 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1929) ; Silver Co. v.
FTC, 289 F. 958 (6th Cir. 1923) ; Guarantee Veterinary Co. v. FTC, 285 F. 853, 857
(2d Cir. 1922) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 310 (7th Cir. 1919).
3. 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1958) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly
the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics; or
(2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly, or indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics.
(b) The dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false advertisement within th eprovisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be
an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce within the meaning of
section 45 (section 5(a) (1)) of this title.
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In 1960, precedent was broken. A complaint was issued against S.
Klein Department Stores for violating section 5 (a) (1) by an "interstate
dissemination" of false advertising without alleging that the merchandise
itself was "in commerce."' After lengthy litigation, a cease and desist
order was issued by the Hearing Examiner.5 Then, paradoxically, the
Commission, without opinion and with two Commissioners dissenting,
dismissed the action.'
Since the Commission gave no reasons for the dismissal, it can only
be speculated whether the majority felt that there was not an adequate
legal basis for jurisdiction or whether the decision was one of policy.
Whatever the reason, the enigmatic finish of S. Klein raises serious questions concerning the policy of the FTC in regard to the enforcement of
section 5(a) (1) and the practice of false advertising. A more detailed
analysis of the S. Klein case may serve to indicate the answers to these
questions and the probable future path that the FTC will take.
The Need for Regulation in. the Intrastate Retail Area. Truthful
advertising has social and economic value because it promotes intelligent
choice in a free market. False advertising, on the other hand, is a
serious problem of increasing legal significance.! Unrealistic list or cost
prices, artificial discounts, misrepresentation of origin, brand or content
of goods, and other fictitious claims are all practices designed to influence the buyer's decision by a distortion of the truth.' Such practices
are not only unfair to competitors who engage in truthful advertising,
but ultimately result in injury to the buyer who relies on the misleading
claims of the advertiser. The problem is magnified by the fact that the
average purchaser today is unable to discover the falsehood contained in
the advertisement until after the sale. The maxim of "caveat emptor"
is increasingly inconsistent with adequate protection to the consumer.
Our economy has ceased to be a face-to-face market when the buyer
4. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1128778 (June 10, 1960).
5. 3 TRADE RFG. REP. 1f 15519 (Oct. 18, 1961).
6. 3 TRADE REG. RE'. 15752 (Feb. 23, 1962). After the complaint was issued, an
interlocutory appeal was taken by the respondent, but denied, with opinion, by the Commission, 3 TRA.E REG. REP. ff 29222 (Dec. 8, 1960). S. Klein then petitioned the district
court for an injunction to prevent the FTC from asserting jurisdiction; however the
cause was dismissed, Civil No. 4177-60, D.D.C., Dec. 28, 1960. Then, after a hearing
on the merits, an order to cease and desist was issued by the Hearing Examiner. On
appeal, the Commission refused to accept either the finding or the order of the Hearing
Examiner, and dismissed the complaint.
7. See generally, Moore, Deceptive Practices and the FTC, 28 TEN. L. REv. 493

(1961).
8. For a comprehensive list of the practices and methods considered by the FTC
to be unfair, see 1959 FTC ANx. REP. 85-90. See generally, Printers' Ink, June 15,
1962, p. 63. Deceptive pricing representations seem to be a continued object of FTC
complaints.
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knows the seller and can adequately judge the goods. Rather, it is an
impersonal market where production is carried on at a distance and knowledge is concentrated on the seller's side. Caveat emptor and permissible
"puffing" are giving way to expanded warranties and public demands
for legal enforcement of high standards in advertising.'
Because the common law remedy of damages for fraud is inadequate,'" a veritable flood of state and federal statutes now define false
advertising and provide criminal and civil sanctions." However, due to
lax or weak enforcement machinery and ambiguous standards, the intended elimination of false and overreaching advertisements has not been
achieved. The problem is compounded by the fact that marketing regions
are not confined to state boundaries. Rather, because of the ease of travel
and the vast numbers of persons who can be reached through the mass
media of communication, the effects of particular practices often extend
into two or more states. Of the hundred major metropolitan markets in
the United States, eighteen are inherently interstate in character because
of population in two or more states.' 2 At least thirty-one more of these
markets are located within thirty miles of state boundaries so that news
media which service them are interstate in character. 8 Of the remaining fifty-one major markets, only a few are located where there is little
possibility of an advertisement placed with media in the market being
distributed to a neighboring state.'4 State agencies as a rule are ill
9. Moore, supra note 7.
10. See generally, Reynolds, Legal Curbs on Advertising, 50 TRADEMiARK REP. 394
(1960) ; Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 596o, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 439 (1960). Prevention
rather than a cure is needed because the consumer has no common law remedy for his
time and trouble where he detects the truth only after investigation or an excursion to
the advertiser's premises. After a purchase, the difficulty of proof is a continuing

obstacle.

11. These statutes have been enacted through the efforts of the aroused public,
organized industry groups, better business bureaus and regulatory agencies. See Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes,and Competitive Effects, 28 GEo. WAsn. L. REv.
621 (1959). For comprehensive tables showing the various state statutes, see Note,

The Regulation of Advertising!, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1098 (1956) ; Printer's Ink, Dec. 4,
1959, pp. 21-22. Generally, violations of these statutes are misdemeanors. The number
of reported cases is small and enforcement seems lax, although threats of prosecution
are sometimes used to obtain voluntary cessation of improper practices. Ordinarily, the
duty of enforcement is detailed to prosecuting agencies which are already overburdened
with more pressing problems. Surveys indicate, however, that a greater number of

prosecutions occur where a special agency is responsible for gaining compliance.
12. Printers' Ink, Oct. 30, 1959, § 1, p. 30.
13. Ibid.
14. Viewed from population alone, five of the ten largest standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas are entirely interstate in character and have a population of approximately 30 million people. See 1960 Census, Bureau of Census; Printers' Ink, Sept. 1,
1960, pp. 23, 28. According to Printers' Ink, Nov. 25, 1960, pp. 21, 23, the largest complex is the New York-Northeastern New Jersey Standard Consolidated Area with a
total of 14,650,818 people, retail sales in excess of $20 billion per year and more than
180,000 retail outlets. The average of one retail outlet per 92 persons in this area is
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equipped to deal with instate activity and local jurisdictional limits prevent the enfrocement of uniform rules within the actual boundaries of
the business world. Clearly, the problem of false advertising is federal
in scope. 5
The FTC has attempted to cope with the problem where goods sold
in interstate commerce are falsely advertised, or where the false advertisements in interstate media or the mails relate to fur" or fabric
labelling,'" food, drugs, devices or cosmetics.'" Yet for forty-six years,
the FTC asserted no jurisdiction over local retailers despite the interstate dissemination of their advertisements. A local retailer could openly
employ a practice which the interstate retailer had been ordered to stop.
The result was a double standard where the state or local authorities did
not coordinate their efforts with the FTC. 9 Such a standard was not
only inequitable to those retailers subject to FTC jurisdiction, but it also
seriously hindered attempts by the Commission to stop deceptive pracslightly higher than the national average of one per 100 persons. This exceptionally
high number of retail organizations greatly complicates any enforcement program; yet,
this was the area in which S. Klein was operating. There are 4,717,000 business firms
in the United States. Of this total, 2,011,000 are engaged in retail trade and 893,000 in
services. (See Printers' Ink, Feb. 16, 1962, p. 13.) Most of these businesses are heavy
users of advertising at the local level. They utilize all media; however, of a total of
approximately $12 billion spent in 1961, the largest segment was for newspaper advertising. Over $2.8 billion or about 23% was spent for newspaper advertising; while
radio accounted for only 3.7% and television 2.4%. The tremendous impact which the
newspaper has on local retail sales was recently demonstrated during a newspaper strike
in Minneapolis. According to Printers' Ink, Sept. 21, 1962, p. 44, the newspapers
vanished from newsstands during April of 1962. The strike lasted for 117 days and the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis estimated that the absence of advertising normally appearing in two daily papers caused a loss of $58 million. Most retail and service firms attempted to make maximum use of the other media, but seemingly it did
not help.
Printers' Ink, Oct. 30, 1959, § 1, p. 347, noted that there are approximately 1,700
daily newspapers in the United States with a total circulation of 57 million subscribers.
15. There appears to be no accurate estimation of the total dollar effect of deceptive advertising on a national basis. The amount undoubtedly would be quite large.
Advertising Age, April 24, 1961, p. 96, reported the statement of an Ohio official who
claimed that false advertisements cost the residents of that state approximately $300
million per annum.
16. Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951), 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1958).
17. Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68
(1958).
18. Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
19. 1960 FTC ANx. REP. 7.
[B]ecause competitive inequities may result when merchandisers of products
sold in interstate commerce are made to comply with standards which may be
ignored by those who sell only locally, the Commission brought a test case during the year. This charged S. Klein Department Stores, of New York City,
with having made false pricing and savings claims for its merchandise in advertising in newspapers and on radio and television. The unusual element of
the complaint is that solely because the alleged false claims were given interstate circulation by the print and broadcast media, the Commission asserted
jurisdiction in the matter.
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tices in a given market area. Such attempts repeatedly met with failure
because limiting the advertising practices of two or three firms who
clearly came within the jurisdiction of the FTC did not adequately solve
the problem. The need for a uniform policy of enforcement was thus
apparent.
Before S. Klein, it was stated that a more uniform policy of enforcement was dependent upon the FTC undertaking to: (1) aid in the promotion of new state laws, or (2) recommend to Congress that new federal legislation be adopted which would give the FTC clear-cut jurisdiction over local retailers who sell intrastate but advertise in interstate
media or the mails, or (3) attempt a test case to determine wheher
jurisdiction could be exercised under the existing law.20 Of these three
alternatives, the latter seemed to offer the best opportunity for success
with a minimum of effort and expense. Evidently, in S. Klein, the Commission initially felt that it had a good test case for laying the groundwork, both legal and practical, for a new enforcement program which
would enable it to regulate false advertising in the intrastate retail area
more effectively.
Interstate Dissemination of Advertisement and FTC Jurisdiction
Uzder Section 5(a)(i). In its original complaint, the FTC charged that
S. Klein "has been and is engaged in disseminating . . . in newspapers

of interstate circulation and in radio and television broadcasts of interstate dissemination, advertisements designed and intended to induce sales
of its merchandise ..
"2"
Thus, for the first time, the FTC sought
jurisdiction over a party under section 5(a) (1) based solely on the dissemination of advertising in interstate commerce and not on the sale of
the advertised product in interstate commerce. The legal basis of such
jurisdiction was challenged by respondent S. Klein.
The constitutional power to regulate "commerce among the states"
has been interpreted as the equivalent of a power to regulate "intercourse
for purposes of trade." It includes the interstate movement of commodities, the interstate transmission of information, and intrastate commerce which affects interstate activity 22 Practically, the power in its
constitutional sense implies a legislative power as broad as the economic
needs of the nation.22 It is clear, therefore, that Congress has the power
20. Advertising Age, May 30, 1960, p. 4.
21. Complaint, In the Matter of S. Klein Dep't Stores, para. 3 (June 10, 1960).
22. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Southern Ry. Co. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20 (1914). Thus, communications of a commercial nature are subject
to regulation by Congress.
23. The constitutional power question has been well litigated. The result is that
Congress has broad powers to legislate in "commerce" matters; therefore, the question
posed is generally that of the congressional intent.
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to regulate interstate advertising with respect to intrastate sales. The
only question relates to the scope of commerce which Congress intended
to subject to the FTC's jurisdiction under section 5(a) (1) of the FTC
Act-all commerce including advertising, or just interstate sales of goods
and services and only such advertising as promotes such sales? Did
Congress, in other words, consider the advertisement and sale of a
product as being separate and distinct unfair practices, or did it consider the advertisement as merely inducing the sale and declare unlawful
only the sale in interstate commerce of the falsely advertised product?
The Hearing Examiner in S. Klein took the position that the advertising and the sale were separate and distinct practices having no necessary relation to each other. Relying on Mueller v. United States24 and
Shafe v. FTC,5 two cases involving the dissemination of false advertising within the meaning of section 12 of the FTC Act, he stated:
[A] showing that the goods advertised by respondent moved in
commerce is not an essential element of the offense. The
gravamen of the charge is the use of misrepresentation in the
24. 262 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1958). This case concerned a product for baldness
(cosmetic) and the dissemination of advertisements. Dictum from the case was that
there is no difference between the fact that the newspaper disseminates the advertisements rather than the individual or firm. In this controversy, the firm did not ship
the cosmetics outside of Texas; however, the violation was under § 12(a), not § 5(a) (1)
of the FTC Act.
25. 256 F.2d 661, 663 (6th Cir. 1958). This case involved a cease and desist order
to prevent the dissemination of false advertisements even though the company was advertising in Michigan papers only and restricted its sales to that state. The product
was patent medicine under § 12(a) of the FTC Act. The court stated that "under this
section (12(a)) it is not necessary that there be a sale in interstate commerce. It is
the dissemination of false advertising that the statute is directed against." Id. at 662.
Cf., Brewer & Sons v. FTC, 158 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1946), compare with Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1946). At 664 of Shafe, the court was of
the opinion that "the false advertising was disseminated in commerce . . . even though
a small percentage of the average daily circulation of the newspaper . . . went into
states other than Michigan." This statement by the court seems to be dictum only.
Cf. Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S.
268 (1934) ; DeGorter v. FTC, 244 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1957). The latter case concerned the Fur Products Labeling Act and the court reasoned:
[I]n regulating interstate transactions under the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, it is not necessary that a regulation be confined to
persons who are also engaged in interstate commerce, since there is no constitutional inhibition against regulating purely local activities, if, in the
opinion of the Congress, they have a deleterious effect on commerce between
the states.
In other words, the power of Congress in the commerce area is both plenary and absolute. In this connection, it should be noted that there have been recent statutes giving
the FTC expanded jurisdiction to reach purely intrastate acts; however, such legislation
has been limited to particular commodities, e.g., wool-Wool Prods. Labeling Act, 54
Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68 (1958); fur-Fur Prods. Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175
(1951), 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1958) ; textiles-Textile Fiber Prods. Identification Act, 72
Stat. 1717 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 70 (1958).
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advertising of the product, not in the actual sale which occurs
thereafter. The act, practice or method of competition charged
to be unfair or deceptive is the use of false advertising claims
in inducing sales, rather than in sales themselves. If the act
or practice charged to be unfair occurs in commerce the Act
has been violated, without a showing that the act or practice
has resulted in a sale in commerce. 6
In that section 12 specifically prohibits the dissemination in commerce of any false advertisement relating to food, drugs, devices or cosmetics, reliance by the Hearing Examiner on the Mueller and Shafe cases
in a case not involving these products is at least questionable. Applying
the doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" to sections 5 (a) (1)
and 12, it can be argued that the FTC has no jurisdiction over the interstate dissemination of false advertisements relating to products other
than food, drugs, devices or cosmetics. Enforcing this maxim of legislative interpretation is the holding of the United States Supreme Court
in Federal Trade Corm'n v. Bunte Bros.,2" a case analogous to S. Klein
in which the FTC sought under section 5 to assert jurisdiction over intrastate sales on the theory that they were "affecting interstate sales." Stating that "When in order to protect interstate commerce Congress has regulated activities which in isolation are merely local, it has normally conveyed its purpose explicitly," 2 the Court held that a "much clearer manifestation of intention than Congress has furnished" in section 5 would
26. 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 15519 (Oct. 18, 1961). In originally denying an interlocutory appeal by S. Klein, 3 TRADE REG. RE'. 1 29222 (Dec. 8, 1960), the Commission
found interstate disseminations of advertising within the purview of § 5(a) (1). They
felt the specified targets of the Act are unfair or deceptive activities in commerce, and
that interstate communications for commercial purposes constitute commerce. There
have been numerous cases where the FTC has issued orders against the "interstate dissemination of false advertisements"; however, jurisdiction was based upon a sale in
commerce. For this reason, such cases are not in point. Yet they do illustrate a recognition of the problem. See Dixie Pecan Growers Exchange, 13 F.T.C. 234 (1930);
Raladam Co., 12 F.T.C. 363, 369 (1929) ; Process Eng'r Co., 7 F.T.C. 287, 295 (1924) ;
Royal Duke Oil Co., 6 F.T.C. 149, 154 (1923); Chemical Fuel Co., 4 F.T.C. 387, 390
(1922) ; Guarantee Veterinary Co., 4 F.T.C. 149, 153-54 (1921), aff'd 258 F. 853 (2d
Cir. 1922) ; Montgomery Ward & Co., 3 F.T.C. 151, 155 (1920) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
1 F.T.C. 316 (1918), affd 258 F. 307, 310 (7th Cir. 1919).
A distinction between "interstate" and "intrastate" disseminations has been recognized by separate prohibitions in a single proscription aimed at both types of volations
where jurisdiction was asserted on a sale in commerce. See Dixie Pecan Growers Exchange, supra; Raladam Co., supra; Turner & Porter, 7 F.T.C. 100, 105 (1924); Royal
Duke Oil Co., supra; Ruby Levy, 4 F.T.C. 209, 214 (1921); Union Soap, 4 F.T.C. 397
(1921) ; Waveryly Brown, 3 F.T.C. 156 (1920). In a few of the preceding cases,
separate proscriptions against both forms of the illegal activity were issued.
27. 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
28. Id.at 351.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

be necessary to justify jurisdiction.29 In light of section 12, S. Klein
would appear to present a stronger case for the application of this rationale. Finally, the fact that the FTC had not asserted jurisdiction over
interstate advertising under section 5 (a) (1) for forty-six years would
support the argument that the FTC does not in fact have such jurisdiction. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Bunlte:
Authority actually granted by Congress of course cannot evap
orate through lack of administrative exercise. But just as
established practice may shed light on the extent of power
conveyed by general statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is equally significant in determining whether such
power was actually conferred."0
Counterbalancing the above arguments against the position of the
Hearing Examiner in S. Klein is the legislative history behind section
5(a) (1) and section 12. During the Senate floor debates prior to passage of the Act, Senator Copeland proposed that section 12 be expanded
to include false advertising relating not only to foods, drugs, devices, or
cosmetics but relating to "any commodity."'" Comparing section 5 (a)
(1) with section 12 and in reply to Senator Copeland, Senator Lea said:
[T]he Federal Trade Commission has always had jurisdiction
over false advertising of foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics as
well as over all other commodities. The new provisions of this
bill dealing with those specific commodities do not confer upon
the Commission jurisdiction which it does not now possess but
29. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 356 (1941).

But Justice Douglas, in the

dissenting opinion, reasoned that unfair competition involves "not only an offender but

also a victim. The fact that the acts of the offender are intrastate is immaterial.

The

purpose of the Act is to protect interstate commerce against specified types of injury."

In other words, it was felt that the injury and not the type of conduct was important
to the determination. At 357, it was noted that "[History] warns us not to whittle

away administrative power by resolving an ambiguity against the existence of that

power where the full arsenal of that power is necessary to cope with the evil at hand."

30. Id. at 355, the majority holding that "'unfair methods of competition in [interstate] commerce'" should not be read as "'unfair methods of competition in any way
affecting interstate commerce.'
31. There was confusion during the Senate floor debates. See 83 CONG. REc. 410,
3255, 3291, 3292, 3293 (1938). Whether § 12(a) should have encompassed all commodities was the subject of serious consideration. Senator Copeland said "Every household in America is being imposed upon by the false advertising of a thousand things
besides foods, drugs, and cosmetics. So . . . my particular plea is that the language
in section 12, subsections (1) and (2), be changed from 'foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics' to 'any commodity.'" Id. at 3291.
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are designed to make its control of such advertising more
effective.3
Although far from conclusive, this exchange indicates that at least some
members of the Senate were under the impression that the FTC did have
jurisdiction under section 5 (a) (1) over the interstate dissemination of
false advertisements. Section 12 merely served to emphasize this power
with respect to certain products.
Finally, it can be argued in support of the Hearing Examiner's
opinion that section 5(a) (1) is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed. If the court should find that jurisdiction over interstate
dissemination of advertising where the sale is not in commerce is necessary before the FTC can adequately and effectively carry out a uniform
policy of enforcement, then the court should permit the FTC to exercise
such power.33 If not explicit, the authority to exercise such power is at
least implied in section 5(a) (1) and it would not constitute judicial
legislation for the court to so construe it.
Based on the above analysis of the legal issues involved in the
S. Klein case, it would appear that the Commission had a reasonable chance
of gaining judicial approval of its asserted right to regulate the interstate
dissemination of false advertisements under section 5 (a) (1) without the
sale of the advertised product itself being in commerce. Certainly, a
court which found favor with this view would not find the legal arguments against such jurisdiction insurmountable. The question remains,
then, why did the FTC decide to drop the case?
The Decision to Dismiss the Charge Against S. Klein-The Need
for a Planned Program of Attack. In view of the reasonable possibility
of ultimate success in the courts, it would seem that the FTC did not dismiss the action against S. KlIein because of purely legal reasons. Rather,
it would appear that the decision was based on policy considerations of an
administrative nature. More precisely, it would appear that the FTC
realized that it was ill prepared to launch a coordinated attack upon the
problem presented by the dissemination in interstate commerce of false
advertisements and decided to wait until such time as it was prepared before testing its jurisdiction in the courts.
The FTC is charged with the primary duty of interpreting and applying the public policy reflected in the FTC Act. It attempts to carry
32. Id. at 3255-56.

33. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948). But cf. Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926) which held "the Federal Trade Commission
is no part of the judicial system. . . . It does not exercise judicial powers. It is an
administrative body created by statute. It has only such duties and powers as are given
it, by expression or fair implication. . . ." Id. at 683.
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out this duty through its investigative 4 and preventive powers.3" The
former includes a duty to investigate and determine what new acts and
practices should be brought within the FTC's jurisdiction." Initially,
with reference to its preventive role, there was some disagreement as to
whether the FTC should act primarily as an extension of the courts, or as
a great public education and information agency such as visualized by
President Wilson." It was established early, however, that its legislative mandate charged the Commission to "stop those methods of competition which fall within the meaning of the word 'unfair'" in their incipiency. 8 The Commission was to act, where possible, in a preventive
manner before the harm precipitated, rather than in a curative role as a
judicial tribunal.
In performing its enforcement function to prevent social harm, the
FTC has used two principal means. The first and by far the most often
relied upon, is mandatory compliance under section 5 (b)." Under this
34. 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1958).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (b) (1958). This is the duty to prevent "persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." Their function has been expressed
as "representing the government as parens partiae, . . . to exercise their common
sense, as informed by their knowledge of the general idea of unfair trade at common
law, and stop all those trade practices that have a capacity or a tendency to injure . . .
quite irrespective of whether the specific practices in question have yet been denounced in common-law cases." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th
Cir. 1919). Accord, FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
36. See 1959 FTC ANN. RE'. 85-90 for a list of practices and methods considered
to be unfair.
37. As originally envisioned by President Wilson, the agency being created would
become
[A]n indispensible instrument of information and publicity . . . a clearing
house for facts by which both the public mind and the managers of great business undertakings should be guided, and . . . an instrumentality for doing

justice where the process of the courts . . .are inadequate to adjust the remedy
to the wrong in a way that will meet all the equities and circumstances of the
case.
51 CONG. Rac. 1963 (1914). See also, BUREAU OF NATIONAL LITERATURE, INC., MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,

Vol.

XVI, 7909-10, 8151 (1925).

38. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931). A duty to act in a preventative manner has been discussed in several cases. See generally, Hastings Mfg. Co. v.
FTC, 153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946) ; Miller & Co. v. FTC,
142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Keller v. FTC, 132 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Koolish v.
FTC, 129 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 483, rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 711
(1942).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958). The number of orders issued by the FTC has
grown steadily each year. In a news release of July 3, 1960, the acting Executive Director of the Commission was quoted as stating that the number of complaints against
deceptive practices issued in 1960 was more than three times the average for any year
from 1949 to 1958. Further, in "Consumer Self Protection and the Federal Trade
Commission," address by Earl W. Kintner, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before a Consumer Conference at Geneva College, Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, April 14,
1961, it was pointed out that "it has been estimated that as early as 1925, orders directed
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quasi-judicial machinery the Commission can, after a hearing, issue a
cease and desist order directing the cessation of a practice found to be
unfair."
The cease and desist order is the backbone of the enforcement program. Yet, in recent years it has become apparent that problems which
have many facets, such as false advertising, are too large in scope to be
dealt with by mandatory compliance alone. As a result, increasing reliance has been placed upon voluntary programs as a means of securing
compliance with the FTC Act. 1
Administered by the Bureau of Industry Guidance, four principal
techniques of voluntary compliance are presently being utilized: (1)
guidance programs,42 (2) trade practice conferences,4 8 (3) trade reguagainst false advertising constituted 70% of the total number of orders issued by the
Commission annually." "Numerically, false advertising provides the bulk of the Commission's casework.

.

.. "

1959 FTC ANN. REP. 4.

40. For an excellent discussion of this procedure, see Note, The Federal Trade
Commission and Reform of the Administrative Process, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 671, 685-96
(1962). See also, 1961 FTC ANN. RFs. 9, 10. In order to bring such an action, three
pre-requisites have been found necessary by court interpretation: "(1) that the methods
complained of are unfair; (2) that they are methods in competition in commerce; and
(3) that a proceeding by the Commission to prevent the use of the methods appears to
be in the interest of the public." FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1931).
The Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the FTC Act changed the interpretation given the
term "competition" as used in this case. Prior to this amendment, the Commission had
no authority to proceed against acts where no substantial harm to competition, present
or potential, was shown. This amendment, therefore, shifted the emphasis from an indirect protection of the public through the protection of the competitive system to a
direct protection of the public itself from injury even where no injury to a competitor
could be shown. See generally, Baker and Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REv. 517 (1962). See
also, FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934) ; FTC v. Royal Milling Co.,
288 U.S. 212, 216 (1933) ; FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929) ; Moretrench Corp.
v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
41. It has been offered that guidance, not methods of mandatory compliance, is
the fundamental function of the FTC. "Let's Ged Rid of Uncertainty," Address by
Paul R. Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before American Association of
Advertising Agencies, The Greenbrier Hotel, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia,
April 28, 1962. See also, "Some Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement," Excerpts from lectures by Professor H. Thomas Austern, New York University School of
Law, Antitrust in Action, April 1, 8 and 22, 1960, p. 17.
42. E.g., Guides Against Bait Advertising and Guides Against Deceptive Pricing.
These guides take the form of informal, interpretative instructions issued to the staff
which are also published. "Where voluntary compliance cannot be obtained, the Guides
serve the additional purpose of spotlighting persistent violations which warrant formal
action." 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 81. Guides have been carried to the local level in many
instances. Also, meetings have been held to effect citywide compliance with the guides,
e.g., FTC News Release, Sept. 11, 1960. As a supplement to the trade practice rules
program, the guide program represents "our greatest tool in assisting . . . self regulation," statement by Earl W. Kintner, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before
Second Annual Mid-Winter Conference of the Advertising Federation of America,
Washington, D. C., Feb. 5, 1960, at p. 37. The guide program is now rather ineffectual
because of the lack of a voluntary enforcement program. Recently, the Commission,
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lation rules, and (4) advisory opinions. As an adjunct to these programs, the FTC can cooperate with state and local agencies and industry
groups."' The most important characteristic of the voluntary compliance
program is the preparation it can provide for the preventive program in
general. 5 "Public education" is an important tool to aid in achievement
of objectives sought by the overall program of enforcement.4
The FTC,
through its resources of both knowledge and experience, is in an excellent position to deal with industry groups through guidelines, education
and cooperation.
Both the mandatory and the voluntary procedures have their functions in the administration of the Federal Trade Commission Act. On
the one hand, the threat of the cease and desist order is sufficient to encourage voluntary compliance by the majority of the members of a given
industry. On the other hand, the compliance secured through the voluntary programs permits the FTC with its limited staff to selectively initiate the mandatory proceedings where they will do the most good.
Neither, however, is sufficient in itself to effectuate an overall policy of
enforcement. Rather, an effective program of total enforcement is dependent upon a balanced plan of attack in which the mandatory mawithout explanation, transferred the programs to the Trade

Practice Conference

Division.
43. See "Uncertainties Under our Antimonopoly Laws," Remarks by Everette
Maclntyre, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, before the Winter Conference

of the American Marketing Association, New York, New York, Dec. 27, 1961, at p. 12,
to the effect that:
[C]onsiderable discussion has centered on the powers of the Federal Trade
Commission to make substantive rules which would cover industry-wide unfair
trade practices. In this discussion, Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act has been cited. . . . It is reasoned that this provision of the law
could be relied upon to aid the Commission in carrying out its responsibilities in
prohibiting the unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts
and practices made unlawful by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Trade practice conference procedures for informational statements designated as Trade
Practice Rules have been utilized for some time. They are designed to afford guidance
and gain voluntary cooperation and compliance. These Trade Practice Rules have, however, been criticized as being too general. See generally, Hill v. FTC, 124 F.2d 104
(5th Cir. 1941); 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 11.
44. "Without self-policing . . . the Commission -would be confronted with a really
hopeless task," Printers' Ink, Feb. 9, 1962, p. 15. See also, Printers' Ink, May 18, 1962,
p. 44 (Legislative recommendations by Association of Better Business Bureaus);
Printers' Ink, Jan. 12, 1962, p. 21 (Cleveland Plan involving a combination committee
with members from the media, advertising groups and the Better Business Bureau);
Advertising Age, Oct. 10, 1960, p. 134 ("hear and tell" meetings).
45. The preventative nature of these methods is particularly important since they
allow an attack on an industry-wide basis rather than on a case-by-case approach. The
economy of such an enforcement technique, if successful, is apparent.
46. "We think that public knowledge of what we do is one of the most effective
ways of discouraging deceit," statement by Earl W. Kintner, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, Printers' Ink, April 22, 1960, p. 13.
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chinery is blended with the voluntary methods of compliance.47 As stated
by Commissioner Elman in his dissenting opinion in Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Gimbel Bros.,4" "The job of an agency, unlike a court, is to
regulate through administration, a unique process of governmental activity that requires positive, planned and systematic effort to achieve the
49
statutory objectives."
Commissioner Elman was addressing his remarks to what he considered to be the apparently inconsistent and often inconsequential attacks by the FTC on a hit and miss basis with no correlation to the overall program of enforcement."0 S. Klein would appear to be an example
of just such an attack. The procedures, both mandatory and voluntary,
were available and were being used in other areas subject to regulation
by the FTC. Yet there appeared to be no coordinated plan for the regu47. It is contended that the answer is a middle ground "where there is a necessary,
reasonable amount of restraint of law coupled with a necessary, reasonable amount of
self-restraint, self-policing and self-discipline." Statement by Earl W. Kintner, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Advertising Age, Dec. 28, 1961, p. 8.
48. 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 15748 (Feb. 23, 1962).
49. Id. at 20568. Commissioner Elman went on to cite President Wilson's address
before both Houses of Congress on Jan. 20, 1914, concerning the proposed function of
the FTC "'as an instrumentality for doing justice to business where the processes of
the courst or the natural forces of correction outside the courts are inadequate . .. '
Ibid. He further referred to FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 435 (1920), in which it was
stated that the FTC was a "'new experiment on old lines.'" In other words, Elman felt
the FTC is not a "passive arbitrator of controversies" like a court which applies specific
legal standards. The idea should be to do justice where the processes of the courts are
inadequate or impractical. Also, planned affirmative action was the assignment under
section 5(b) of the FTC Act, not a hit and miss approach, but rather "selectivity of
enforcement." In citing REDFORD, NATIONAL REGUjLATORY CouIssioxs: NEED FOR A
NEW LOOK, 15 (1959) ; HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE Comt SiON, 337 (1924), Elman noted that the Commission has invariably through its history handled too many
cases, or quantity instead of quality with the result that the public interest has not always been discernible. In summary, he pointed out that "the Commission is not confined to a choice between 'issue a complaint' or 'file and forget' . . . ."which would
allow the ignoring of violations. "The genius of the administrative process is that it affords flexibility of action in dealing with problems." Id. at 20572. Further, he noted
that formal proceedngs often are disproportionate in expense to the benefits obtained,
and informal or voluntary compliance procedures, guidance programs, and other state
and federal agencies may provide the solution so that the FTC can get on with the
purpose of the act. Ibid.
50. In charging the Commission with the basic duty of protecting our competitive
free enterprise system, its function as a tribunal is probably indispensable; yet, its
ability to be conceptually consistent by legal decisions has been challenged because of a
lack of conformity with economic realities.
"It is of capital importance that the business men of this country should be relieved
of all uncertainties of law with regard to their enterprises and investments and a clear
path indicated which they can travel without anxiety," "Uncertainties Under our Antimonopoly Laws," Remarks by Everette Maclntyre Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, before the Winter Conference of the American Marketing Association, New
York, New York, Dec. 27, 1961, p. 6. See also, "Let's get Rid of Uncertainty," Address
by Paul R. Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before American Association
of Advertising Agencies, The Greenbrier Hotel, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia,
April 28, 1962.
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lation of the dissemination in interstate commerce of false advertising.
There was no voluntary program in effect nor were there any plans for
such a program."' Practically, it may well be that New York City is
much too large a market area to initiate a program of city-wide or industrywide clean up against the type of advertising allegedly used by
S. Klein.52 Whatever the reason, it is clear that without such a voluntary program, the effectiveness of a cease and desist order is greatly
limited.
Thus it appears that while from a legal point of view S. Klein was a
good test case for the FTC to seek jurisdiction over the interstate dissemination of false advertisements under section 5(a) (1), from an administrative or policy perspective it had serious shortcomings. Whether
the FTC was capable of going into the retail market with the full capacity
to carry out compliance was questionable. Without such capabilities, the
effectiveness of the total program of enforcement would be minimal.
The decision to dismiss the case against S. Klein should therefore probably be construed to mean that the majority of Commissioners felt that
the overall program of enforcement would not be benefited because of
existing inadequacies in the voluntary compliance program. 3
Conclusion. Jurisdiction over interstate disseminations of advertising continues to be the key to the success of any future plan of enforcement on the retail level. Assertion of such jurisdiction depends, however, upon the development of a planned and co-ordinated program of
enforcement by the FTC. The mandatory machinery is necessary not
51. This does not mean that the FTC has not experimented in both city and regional voluntary programs to eliminate specified types of misleading advertising, 1960
FTC ANx. REP. 3. See also, Printers' Ink, Jan. 12, 1962, p. 23 for a brief discussion of
the Cleveland Plan which has been adopted in fifty cities. It utilizes a review panel
composed of representatives from advertisers, advertising agencies, media, and the Better Business Bureau. The Plan provides a striking illustration of a voluntary compliance program without public fanfare and devoid of hard feelings because of discrimination. Printers' Ink, April 1, 1960, p. 12, mentions Chairman Kintner's endorsement of the Cleveland Plan concept.
52. See Business Week, Aug. 27, 1960, p. 58. The FTC admitted that a victory
"would certainly open up a tremendous new field." One member of the staff added,
however, that "Lord knows we have enough to do now. Maybe we are biting off more
than we can chew."
53. Printers' Ink, Jan. 12, 1962, p. 20, points out the growing pressure in government circles for increased control of advertising. See also, Note, The Regulation of
Advertisitg!, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1077 (1956) which argues that enforcement at the local
level, except in the very large cities, cannot be achieved by mere encouragement of local
action. Further, the scope of the enforcement problem, even on a state wide basis, seems
to demand a state administrative agency similar in concept to the FTC. Such an agency
would have the marked advantage of being able to proceed against a person without
branding him a criminal such as would be the case where the attorney general or a local
prosecutor has the enforcement responsibility. At 1078, it is noted that the potential
jurisdictional conflict between such an agency and the FTC should be recognized and
the state statutes drafted with this in mind.
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only to penalize those who do not comply with the provisions of the FTC
Act, but also as a spur to voluntary compliance. Yet, as noted above,
without an effective program of voluntary compliance, the mandatory
machinery is not sufficient to deal with the problem. S. Klein served to
focus attention on this fact.
The FTC still has the three alternatives available to it prior to
S. Klein for gaining jurisdiction over the interstate dissemination of advertising. It can aid in the promotion of new state laws for the regulation of false advertising. This would appear to be the most burdensome
alternative and the least likely of immediate success. Secondly, it can
press Congress for an unequivocal grant of power to deal with interstate
advertising and more funds to cope with the problem. In this regard, it
is suggested that acceptance of such a proposal by Congress would be
enhanced by a demonstrated ability of the FTC to deal with the problem
through voluntary procedures. If its efforts to enforce its jurisdiction
are then blocked by unfavorable judicial decisions, Congress would be
more likely to pass legislation paving the way for FTC jurisdiction in
this area. Finally, the FTC can select another test case, perhaps in a
smaller community, and aim for a court fight. Such a decision, however, is dependent upon a shift of opinion among the commissioners who
evidently did not think that the time was ripe for such a test in S. Klein.
Regardless of the path the FTC chooses to take, one thing is clear from
the experience of S. Klein. If the FTC is to gain jurisdiction over the
interstate dissemination of advertising, it must earn its right to such jurisdiction by developing a balanced plan of total enforcement; for only by
co-ordinating the mandatory machinery with the voluntary procedures
of enforcement can that middle ground "where there is a necessary, reasonable amount of restraint of law coupled with a necessary, reasonable
amount of self restraint, self policing and self discipline" be reached."4
54. Statement by Earl W. Kintner, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Advertising Age, Dec. 28, 1961, p. 8.

